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 The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism: 
Conflict and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization 
 
Abstract: A key development during the Obama Administration was the increasing 
importance of state attorneys general (AGs) in national policymaking. This article examines the 
dual roles that AGs played during the Obama years. The first role was highly contentious, with 
Republican AGs leading several multistate challenges to Obama Administration priorities and 
successfully limiting Obama’s policy legacy. The second role was more cooperative, involving 
increasing coordination between AGs and their federal counterparts in national enforcement 
efforts. Relying on case studies in the areas of immigration enforcement, climate change 
regulation, and the oversight of for-profit higher education, this article highlights several crucial 











 Throughout Barack Obama’s presidency, the partisan divides that have been a staple of 
contemporary American politics continued to widen. The two parties are further apart 
ideologically now than they have been in decades, as both political elites and members of the 
mass public have become increasingly polarized (Theriault 2008; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). 
Scholars examining these trends in political polarization have noted how they have trickled down 
to the states and affected state-level institutions. State legislatures, for example, have become 
increasingly polarized in recent years (Shor and McCarty 2011; Jordan and Bowling 2017). This 
state-level polarization has contributed to a “fragmented federalism” marked by more 
contentious relationships both between states and the federal government as well as among the 
states themselves (Bowling and Pickerill 2013). 
This article considers how these trends have affected a set of state-level actors who have 
gained additional prominence during the Obama years: state attorneys general (AGs). Building 
upon their successes during previous administrations, AGs became a more entrenched part of the 
national policy landscape during Obama’s presidency. Most prominently, coalitions of mostly 
Republican AGs aggressively challenged Obama Administration initiatives such as the Clean 
Power Plan, various aspects of the Affordable Care Act, and new rules pertaining to transgender 
rights. Many of these efforts successfully limited, delayed, or curtailed Obama’s regulatory 
agenda, particularly during his second term. Meanwhile, Democratic AGs used their powers to 
try to achieve national policy gains, including through corporate investigations of energy 
companies they accused of thwarting efforts to address climate change. 
This AG activism reverberated throughout the American political landscape, frequently 
sparking partisan responses. Republican and Democratic AGs frequently squared off in court 
along partisan lines to oppose their fellow AGs’ efforts. State legislators and governors battled 
 with their state AGs (who are independently elected in most states) over the right to represent 
their states in litigation, and AGs were criticized both for their willingness to bring litigation and 
their refusal to defend their state in cases involving hot-button issues such as same-sex marriage, 
voter ID laws, and political redistricting (e.g., Jarvis and Blythe 2016). Congress even became 
involved in state-level investigations for the first time, with members of Congress going as far as 
to issue subpoenas to AGs accused of harassing corporations (Schwartz 2016b). 
While this partisan conflict among AGs grew during the Obama Administration, AGs 
still engaged in a significant degree of cooperative, bipartisan behavior. AGs worked together on 
several investigations of corporate entities throughout this period, including on important anti-
fraud initiatives, crime control, and drug policy. Additionally, from the first weeks of the Obama 
presidency, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) signaled that it would seek closer relationships 
with its state counterparts to tackle issues of common concern of the federal and state 
governments. This led to the creation of new collaborative efforts including the Financial Fraud 
Enforcement Task Force, which (among many other efforts) concluded a major $26 billion 
settlement with the nation’s five largest mortgage lenders over allegations stemming from the 
mortgage crisis. 
This article examines both the conflictual and cooperative aspects of AG activities during 
Obama’s presidency. It builds upon recent scholarly work exploring the institutional 
development of AGs and their increasing prominence in national policymaking. This increasing 
prominence in national politics began as early as the 1980s, when groups of AGs began working 
cooperatively to solve issues of concern to multiple states. Cornell Clayton noted how the “New 
Federalism” of the 1970s and 1980s reshaped the office by thrusting additional responsibilities 
on AGs. While AGs were once state-focused actors largely disconnected from one another, AGs 
 created new mechanisms of interstate collaboration to help them handle their growing role in 
national policymaking (Clayton 1994, 542). The crucial breakthrough came in the late 1990s, 
when forty-six AGs signed a $206 billion settlement with the tobacco industry that 
fundamentally altered tobacco policy and regulation in the United States (Derthick 2012). By 
working together across state lines, AGs pooled their resources, provided legal heft to novel legal 
arguments, and found success in court against a major industry that private plaintiffs had 
unsuccessfully battled for decades. 
AGs have since used this cooperative multi-state model to influence national policy in 
several other ways. Building upon their tobacco success, entrepreneurial AGs sought to reshape 
industry practices in the name of consumer protection (Provost 2003; 2006). Particularly during 
the George W. Bush Administration, AGs also became more aggressive in employing multistate 
strategies against the federal government. Activist Democratic AGs such as New York’s Eliot 
Spitzer led numerous campaigns to prevent attempts at regulatory rollback by federal agencies, 
particularly concerning environmental policy (Nolette 2015a). AGs also became among the most 
active filers of amicus curiae briefs in federal courts – activity that has become increasingly 
partisan since the beginning of the 2000s (Lemos and Quinn 2015). All of this building activity 
since the late 1990s set the stage for AGs to be critical players on the national stage during the 
Obama Administration. 
This activity was made possible in part by Congress’s decision to structure much of the 
contemporary regulatory state on the frame of cooperative federalism, thereby granting state and 
local governments key roles in the administration of federal policy. States are on the front lines 
of implementing much of the American environmental and health care policy regimes, for 
example, such as with enforcing clean air standards or administering Medicaid. This choice 
 required federal and state actors to work together to solve common problems, but it also provided 
states additional leverage to pursue their own agendas within these policy regimes and to make 
demands on the federal government. Among other things, it led to the creation of new 
mechanisms of coordination and compromise among and between levels of government, such as 
the rise of negotiated waivers allowing for state-by-state variation in implementation of federal 
law (Thompson and Gusmano 2014; Wong 2015).  
The increasing institutional resources available to the AGs has also enabled their 
activism. In addition to creating new avenues of collaboration amongst themselves, AGs have 
been aided by other institutions and actors that have encouraged state litigation. The federal 
judiciary, for example, granted states “special solicitude” when determining whether states had 
standing to sue, making it easier for AGs to use the courts in challenges to national policy. This 
standing doctrine, a key part of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007), offered a hook for AGs to bring challenges to new Obama-era laws and regulations. 
At the same time, Congress continued to bolster AG power during the Obama years, providing 
AGs additional powers to enforce federal consumer protection laws. State legislatures also 
frequently allied with their state’s AGs, providing additional resources and legal authority to 
bring lawsuits against corporations and the federal government alike. Meanwhile, ideological 
interest groups increasingly viewed AGs as powerful allies, providing strategic and financial 
support for multistate AG litigation (Nolette 2014). 
This article examines how trends in AG activity that had been building since the late 
1990s became an entrenched part of the national policy landscape during Obama’s presidency. 
During this time, AGs of both parties fully realized the benefits of collective action, taking 
advantage of collaborations amongst themselves – sometimes along partisan lines and other 
 times on a bipartisan basis – to provide rapid responses to federal actions or corporate activities. 
The scope of their collaborations has also encompassed policy areas in which states traditionally 
played a smaller role vis-à-vis the federal government, particularly immigration. This increased 
coordination has allowed AGs to act quickly as well as provide greater support for novel legal 
arguments. 
Their efforts reflect their importance as both key veto points and opportunity points in 
contemporary American federalism (Wittes and Nivola 2015). On the one hand, their activities 
have contributed to national policy “gridlock” by delaying or stopping implementation of federal 
laws and regulations. In the last years of the Obama Administration – and first few months of the 
Trump Administration – AGs took advantage of the increasing willingness of single federal 
district courts to issue national injunctions that blocked policies nationwide (Bray forthcoming). 
On the other hand, AGs have used their positions to circumvent gridlock by acting as opportunity 
points for policy change when Congress is unwilling or unable to act. Through lawsuits and 
settlements with corporate defendants, such as the for-profit education sector discussed in this 
article, AGs have shaped the regulatory environment of entire national industries in the absence 
of new federal laws or regulations. In this sense, the increasing polarization of state level politics 
might open more opportunities for policy change, even as polarization in Congress stymies 
lawmaking. 
This article proceeds by first examining the trends towards greater conflictual 
relationships between the AGs and the federal government as well as among the AGs 
themselves. Following an overview of partisan AG-led lawsuits against Obama Administration 
policies and the broader trends they highlight, I turn to two case studies illustrating the 
contentious side of contemporary AG activism. The first examines Texas v. United States, in 
 which several Republican AGs successfully halted two centerpieces of President Obama’s 
immigration policies. The second explores AGs’ role in climate change policy, including a 
multistate AG effort in West Virginia v. EPA that blocked Obama’s efforts to institute stricter 
limits on greenhouse gases. While that effort was largely Republican, Democratic AGs used the 
powers of their office to begin a novel investigation of ExxonMobil for allegedly interfering with 
climate science. 
While this illustrates the growth of increasing conflict in AG activism, the next section 
considers how important elements of AG activities remain cooperative and bipartisan. Especially 
important was the increased use of federal-state enforcement taskforces during the Obama 
Administration in which federal and state actors worked together to address common concerns. 
Following an overview of this activity, I turn to a case study examining joint federal-state 
enforcement actions in the for-profit higher education industry. This highlights a more 
cooperative side of the relationship between AGs and their federal counterparts.  
Analyzing these trends provides insight into how AGs’ increasingly prominent role on 
the national stage both complicates and complements the operation of contemporary national 
policy. This role reflects deepening “trickle-down polarization” as partisanship on the national 
level has been increasingly reflected in the states, but also highlights that cooperative efforts 
aiming to solve shared problems remains possible even in this increasingly polarized era. 
 
POLARIZATION AND CONFLICT IN AG ACTIVITY 
As noted above, polarization among AGs has been building since AGs became more 
involved in national politics and policy. Shortly after the tobacco litigation, for example, AGs 
formed separate partisan organizations that have since become important organizations for 
 fundraising and strategy development, with the Republican Attorneys General Association 
forming in 1999 and the Democratic Attorneys General Association forming in 2002. During the 
George W. Bush Administration, AG activism was often driven by Democratic AGs seeking to 
fill what they viewed as “regulatory gaps” left open by federal inaction in areas including climate 
change, prescription drug regulation, and consumer protection. Prominent Democratic AGs such 
as Eliot Spitzer, who was empowered in part because of Wall Street’s presence in New York and 
also because of the particularly broad nature of the New York AG’s legal powers, used numerous 
innovative legal theories as a method of pushing back on the deregulatory agenda of the Bush 
Administration. 
With a new Democratic administration entering the White House in 2009, Republican 
AGs essentially flipped the script. In a mirror image of Democratic efforts to push back on 
deregulatory efforts of the Bush Administration, Republican AGs sought to stymie President 
Obama’s regulatory expansions. The key initial collaboration involved working on a potential 
challenge to the so-called “Cornhusker Kickback” that was part of the original version of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 While this provision was dropped from the 
final legislation, this initial collaboration eventually blossomed into a multistate effort raising 
several constitutional challenges to the ACA.2 Among other arguments, the states’ lawsuit 
claimed that the Medicaid expansion provision of the ACA violated federalism principles by 
essentially forcing the states to go along with a federal program. These arguments ultimately 
succeeded in limiting the ACA’s Medicaid expansion by allowing states to opt out of the 
expansion, which subsequently set up contentious state-level fights over heath care provision. 
The ACA litigation also presaged later AG challenges to other Obama-era policies. To give a 
 sense of the expansiveness of these multistate AG challenges, Table 1 highlights several of the 
most prominent AG-led lawsuits against Obama Administration policies. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Recent Trends Towards Greater Conflict in AG Activities 
The emergence of a distinctly Republican AG activism is perhaps the most prominent 
trend in AG activity that emerged during the Obama Administration. This trend contrasts with 
the comparatively subdued Republican AG activity during the previous Democratic presidential 
administration. Republican AGs attempted few multistate challenges to President Bill Clinton’s 
regulatory and legislative program, and even most of these were bipartisan efforts.3 Republican 
AGs formed the Republican Attorneys General Association in 1999 largely in response to the 
alleged “regulation through litigation” engaged in by liberal AGs; but this organization focused 
initially on fundraising goals rather than litigation strategy (Curriden 1999). With a Republican 
president subsequently entering office, Republican AGs took a mainly reactive approach, 
defending against challenges brought by increasingly aggressive Democratic AGs. Obama’s 
presidency provided Republican AGs an opportunity to go on the offensive. Collaboration on 
ACA litigation, combined with the 2010 elections that swept a new activist group of 
conservative AGs into office, entrenched Republican AGs as a strong force against federal 
regulatory expansion.4 In addition to collaborating on direct legal challenges to the Obama 
Administration, Republican AGs filed scores of multistate amicus briefs in federal courts 
concerning several highly contentious issues and were active in multistate attempts to affect the 
regulatory process (Nolette 2014). 
 Related to the rise of Republican AG activism was a second major trend: deepening 
polarization among AGs themselves. As both liberal and conservative AGs have increasingly 
used their offices to challenge federal policy, it has spurred AGs on the other side of the partisan 
divide to form counter-coalitions directly opposing the efforts of their fellow AGs. During the 
ACA litigation, for example, an entirely Democratic coalition of AGs formed to defend the law 
in court against the entirely Republican AG coalition challenging it.5 As challenges to Obama’s 
policies became regularized, the shape of these partisan coalitions has become quite predictable 
and stable. Similar counter-coalitions formed in response to virtually all of major legal lawsuits 
initiated by Republican AGs against Obama Administration policies – a divide that also appears 
in amicus filings in the Supreme Court (Nolette 2014).  
The polarization among the AGs themselves has been accompanied by strengthening 
collaborations between AGs and ideological allies both inside and outside government. During 
the ACA litigation, for example, AGs worked closely with the National Federation of 
Independent Business and other business groups throughout the litigation. These collaborations 
included both discussions about legal strategies as well as pooling financial resources allowing 
the coalition to hire prominent outside attorneys to direct the lawsuits (Elmore 2011). 
Democratic AG coalitions have included similar collaborations with liberal interest groups, such 
as environmental and health care advocacy organizations. For example, the 2007 Massachusetts 
v. EPA litigation involved close collaboration between the twenty-nine state and interest group 
plaintiffs aligned against the EPA in the case. Meanwhile, AGs have increasingly coordinated 
with ideological allies within government as well. In several AG-led lawsuits, members of 
Congress filed amicus briefs along partisan lines bolstering the arguments made by their state-
level ideological allies. As discussed further below, congressional committees have even gotten 
 directly involved in state-level investigations, using their subpoena power to advance the goals of 
like-minded AGs.  
I turn now to a pair of case studies, involving immigration and climate change, that 
illustrate the intensification of AG conflict during the Obama Administration. As Table 1 
indicates, these areas reflect only two of the many in which AGs led challenges to Obama’s 
policies. I focus on immigration and climate change in part because they represent perhaps the 
two most important substantive areas of policy in which Obama attempted to use executive 
authority to secure significant policy gains even in the face of congressional hostility. That AGs 
successfully stymied these crucial aspects of Obama’s legacy is an indication of AGs’ 
importance in contemporary American politics.  
Additionally, both cases are excellent examples of the sorts of novel argumentation that 
has become a feature of multistate AG activism. Texas v. United States was the most aggressive 
attempt of AGs yet to influence a policy regime not built upon the structure of cooperative 
federalism but that had instead been controlled chiefly by the federal government. Relying upon 
innovative arguments about why they had standing to challenge the federal government in this 
area, Republican AGs ironically paved the way for successful Democratic AG challenges to 
immigration orders issues in early part of the Trump Administration. Unlike with immigration 
policy, environmental policy has been built upon a frame of cooperative federalism. Yet the 
AGs’ climate change litigation illustrates how the cooperative model – by granting states key 
roles in national policy regimes – also contributes to partisan conflict as AGs have become more 
polarized. Partisan groups of AGs have employed both the veto points and opportunity points 
inherent in America’s federal system to both push back on federal policy and try to circumvent 
Congress when it declined to create new policies. 
  
Disrupting Federal Executive Action: AGs and Obama’s Immigration Policy 
Immigration has been one of the most polarizing issues in American politics over the last 
few years, and that polarization has been reflected in AG responses to federal actions concerning 
the issue. Opposing coalitions of AGs faced off against each other along partisan lines when the 
federal Department of Justice challenged new state laws in Arizona and elsewhere pertaining to 
undocumented immigrants (Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 [2012]). Most prominently, 
AGs led a major challenge to the Obama Administration’s attempts to achieve changes in the 
immigration system through executive actions taken in the absence of new congressional 
legislation. This challenge, Texas v. United States, illustrates the emergence of Republican AG 
activism and the deepening polarization among AGs. It also demonstrates the AGs’ increasing 
involvement in issues, such as immigration, traditionally viewed as within national control. 
 
Obama’s Executive Actions and Subsequent AG Challenges 
Texas v. U.S. challenged a series of Obama Administration executive actions following 
failed congressional efforts to enact the DREAM Act, legislation that would have allowed 
undocumented immigrants to apply for lawful permanent resident status. Two programs were 
particularly relevant to the litigation: the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program and the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA) initiative. DACA, implemented by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 
2012, permitted individuals who first came to the US as children to apply for deferred action 
status and employment authorizations for a renewable two-year period. In November 2014, the 
DHS announced an expansion of DACA, removing an age cap in the original program that 
 excluded some older undocumented immigrants and expanded work authorizations from two to 
three years. The DHS simultaneously announced the new DAPA program that sought to 
indefinitely delay deportation of the undocumented immigrant parents of lawful U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents. DAPA, while not granting any new legal status, would effectively allow 
approximately four million undocumented immigrants to remain in the country. Both DAPA and 
the expanded DACA relied upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by aiming to cut back 
on aggressive deportation actions. 
Only a few days after the Obama Administration announced both actions, Texas AG 
Greg Abbott announced that he was leading a seventeen-state coalition challenging the executive 
actions in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The coalition, which soon 
expanded to twenty-six states, argued that both directives directly harmed the states by leading to 
a “flood of immigration across the Texas-Mexico border.” This, in turn, threatened to bolster 
drug cartel activity within Texas and other states and force states to “expend substantial 
resources on law enforcement, healthcare, and education.” The authorization of undocumented 
immigrants to obtain work permits would also raise additional permit processing costs for the 
states, and the grant of deferred action would increase costs relating to issuance of drivers’ 
licenses to the beneficiaries of the program.6 
The plaintiff AGs made two main sets of legal arguments, one constitutional and one 
statutory. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the actions violated the Take Care Clause in Article II 
of the Constitution because they amounted to changing the law as opposed to simply using 
discretion to shape its enforcement. In particular, the AGs pointed to several immigration laws 
that they argued placed a mandatory duty on the executive branch to deport individuals not in the 
country legally. Furthermore, Congress had already specified a procedure for undocumented 
 parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents to stay in the United States. Contravening 
these congressional procedures, the states argued, was not within the president’s power to 
“faithfully execute the law.”7 In addition to this constitutional argument, the AGs argued that the 
administration had violated the procedures for creating new rules required by Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). For most rules, the APA requires that the agency provide notice of its 
proposed rules and an opportunity for affected parties to comment on them. Because neither 
DACA nor DAPA went through this notice-and-comment rulemaking, the states argued, the 
agency had illegally sidestepped statutory requirements. The AGs made a substantive APA 
argument as well, arguing that even if the Administration had followed the APA’s procedures, 
the orders would still be invalid because the DHS’ actions essentially rewrote the law as opposed 
to enforcing it.8 
Of the twenty AGs involved in the challenge, all but one were Republican.9 The 
additional state plaintiffs included the governors of several states whose AG declined to join the 
lawsuit. Throughout much of the litigation, this Republican coalition faced off against a sixteen-
member all-Democratic AG coalition that defended the Obama Administration’s actions through 
amicus curiae filings. Democratic AGs argued that far from hurting states, DACA and DAPA 
would actually benefit states by increasing state income tax revenues, improving public safety, 
and providing a more secure living situation for resident children of undocumented immigrants.10 
Additionally, they argued that several of the alleged harms suffered by states – such as additional 
costs accrued because of the issuance of driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants – were 
self-inflicted since neither federal initiative required states to issues such licenses to 
undocumented individuals.11 
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
The Courts’ Decisions 
On February 16, 2015, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction against DAPA 
and the expanded DACA, upholding the stay a couple months later. The court rejected the 
Obama Administration’s position that both executive actions merely represented the exercise of 
the DHS’s broad discretion to implement immigration law. Instead, Obama’s executive actions 
were less like administrative discretion and more like a substantive rule that – like most 
regulatory changes – must go through the processes established by the APA. While the APA 
allows for “general statements of policy” to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking, these 
immigration orders spurred a substantive change in existing law, had a binding effect on DHS 
practice, and thus were subject to the APA. Because the DHS failed to subject the orders to the 
APA, the orders were invalid. (Because the court held that the federal government had violated 
the APA’s procedural requirements, the court declined to address the constitutional Article II 
arguments.) Enjoining the program was appropriate since “without a preliminary injunction…the 
States [would face] the substantially difficult – if not impossible – task of retracting any benefits 
or licenses already provided to DAPA beneficiaries. This genie would be impossible to put back 
into the bottle” (Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 673 [S.D. Tex. 2015]). 
On appeal, a divided three-member panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction on 
November 9, 2015. The lengthy decision mirrored much of the District Court’s holding, holding 
that the plaintiff states were likely to prevail on their claims that the executive actions improperly 
sidestepped the APA’s requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, the majority 
went beyond the District Court by also accepting the states’ substantive APA claims and 
 criticizing the federal government’s interpretation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
(INA). Per the majority, “the INA flatly does not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal 
aliens as lawfully present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and state 
benefits, including work authorization” (Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 184 [5th Cir. 
2015]). In short, even if DHS had properly followed the APA’s procedural rules – which the 
Fifth Circuit held it did not – the orders would still be invalid because the INA did not provide 
DHS the broad authority it claimed when issuing the orders.  
The DOJ sought review of this Fifth Circuit panel decision in the Supreme Court, and the 
Court granted certiorari not only on the APA issues decided by the lower courts but, intriguingly, 
on the Take Care Clause issue as well. This seemingly set the stage for a major decision in the 
summer of 2016, but Justice Antonin Scalia’s death only a few weeks after the cert grant cast 
doubt on how the Court would proceed. The answer came on June 23, 2016, when the Court, in a 
single sentence holding with no reasoning provided, upheld the Fifth Circuit by an equally 
divided (four-four) court. 
The Supreme Court’s split decision by an eight-member court upheld the District Court’s 
original stay of DAPA and the expanded DACA. The Court’s denial of a rehearing on the first 
day of its 2016-2017 term effectively put an end to the programs. This was a considerable blow 
to Obama’s overall immigration legacy, and ensured that the question of how to handle millions 
of undocumented immigrants would be deferred to the Donald Trump Administration. While the 
Trump Administration had not as of this writing reversed the programs as he had pledged to do 
during the presidential campaign, the new administration’s different approach to immigration 
issues appears likely to vindicate the plaintiff AGs’ litigation strategy of forcing delays in policy 
implementation. 
  
AG Activism and State Standing 
The Texas v. U.S. litigation helps illustrate the polarized nature of AG activism during the 
Obama Administration. As they have in numerous policy areas, Republican AGs have harnessed 
coordinated strategies, previously used mainly by Democratic AGs during the Bush 
Administration, to push back on President Obama’s policies. Moreover, this litigation illustrates 
how AGs have increasingly split along partisan lines to face off against one another in court. 
Here, as elsewhere, Republican and Democratic AGs formed opposing coalitions either 
challenging or supporting federal policy. Among other things, it serves as a reminder that when 
“the states” sue it really means that “the AGs” – all with partisan affiliations – are typically the 
ones bringing the lawsuits. 
One important issue the Supreme Court’s one-sentence decision left unresolved was the 
threshold issue of whether AGs had standing to challenge the Obama Administration’s actions in 
the first place. This standing issue received a great deal of attention in both lower court cases, 
with both courts providing expansive standing for AGs to challenge federal immigration policy 
despite the federal government’s traditionally exclusive role over this area. The District Court 
devoted a significant portion of its opinion to the issue, holding that the states had demonstrated 
concrete harm, that these harms were caused by the federal government’s actions, and that the 
harms could be redressed by a favorable court decision (Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 
591, 614-644 [S.D. Tex. 2015]). 
This was an important holding, not only because it allowed the plaintiff AGs to proceed 
to the merits but because it suggested that AGs could rely upon an expansive interpretation of 
“concrete” state harms in order to get into court. The Fifth Circuit’s decision was even friendlier 
 to state standing claims. Relying more heavily on this ground than did the District Court, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the states were entitled to “special solicitude” in the court’s standing 
analysis. This doctrine had been part of the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision in 
2007, which held that a coalition of AGs had standing to challenge the EPA’s refusal to regulate 
greenhouse gases. According to the Massachusetts majority, the states “are not normal litigants 
for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction,” since they have “quasi-sovereign” interests in 
their territory that can be affected by federal action. Because states surrendered some of their 
sovereign prerogatives to the federal government when they joined the union – Massachusetts 
cannot invade New York to force the latter to reduce pollution drifting into the former – states 
should have additional ability to protect their interests in the courts. The Fifth Circuit applied this 
rationale to immigration, holding that “DAPA affects the states’ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests by 
imposing substantial pressure on them to change their laws, which provide for issuing driver’s 
licenses to some aliens and subsidizing those licenses” (Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 
153 [5th Cir. 2015]). 
Since the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, it has not been clear just how far the 
“special solitude” rule would stretch. However, the Fifth Circuit’s decision illustrates that the 
special solicitude standard is alive and well, providing an additional legal avenue for AGs to 
challenge federal policy. In addition to relying on this standard in Texas v. U.S., Republican AGs 
used this “special solicitude” standard to argue that they had standing to challenge the Affordable 
Care Act, for instance (Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606n5 [E.D. Va. 2010]). More 
recently, Democratic AGs relied upon the special solitude standard to challenge President 
Trump’s immigration orders.12 In short, this standard has proven to be a source of considerable 
 leverage for AGs to challenge federal policy – even in areas like immigration law that have 
traditionally been controlled by the federal government. 
 
The Expansion of AG Polarization: Climate Change and the AGs  
American environmental policy operates as a classic example of cooperative federalism. 
Under many key environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act (CAA), states serve a 
primary role in implementing minimum pollution standards set by the federal government. This 
approach aims to both harness regulatory power on both levels of government and to reduce a 
potentially destructive “race to the bottom” in state environmental standard-setting (Engel 2015). 
While this cooperative model has prompted federal and state officials to work together to solve 
common concerns, it also opened the door for states to have greater say concerning the shape and 
extent of national regulatory policy. The structure of this “cooperative” regulatory regime 
provides opportunities for state officials to both work with and push back against federal 
approaches in this area. 
AGs have taken advantage of this dynamic to emerge as major players in environmental 
policy over the past two presidential administrations. During the George W. Bush 
Administration, coalitions of mostly Democratic AGs frequently took the EPA to court to push 
back on what they viewed as the administration’s lackadaisical approach to addressing emerging 
environmental issues. The AGs’ most important litigation campaigns concerned climate change, 
which aimed to prod the federal government to take more aggressive steps to address greenhouse 
gases in the absence of congressional or federal executive action. In 2007, a coalition of twelve 
AGs, led by Massachusetts AG Tom Reilly, scored a major Supreme Court victory in the 
aforementioned Massachusetts v. EPA. This case established both that the EPA could regulate 
 greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and rejected the reasons the EPA had offered 
to explain why it had refused to regulate them. This, in turn, provided the legal authority for the 
EPA to start addressing climate change through the regulatory process (Nolette 2015a). 
The AGs’ involvement in this area intensified as the Obama Administration used this 
legal authority to take numerous steps to regulate greenhouse gases. I focus on two aspects of the 
AGs’ involvement here. The first is a major challenge to a central Obama climate change 
initiative, the Clean Power Plan. The main case, West Virginia v. EPA, is emblematic of the 
partisan trends and coalitions among AGs that have become entrenched during the Obama years. 
Similar to the immigration case, this litigation has spurred opposing coalitions of AGs to take the 
side of the federal government against their fellow states. 
However, it was not just Republican AGs taking the initiative against Obama and 
Democratic AG allies. Liberal AGs sought to use a different strategy – modelled in some ways 
on the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s – to address the issue. Starting in early 2016, a group 
of AGs launched a “AGs United for Clean Power” initiative involving investigations into energy 
firms. Of particular importance was an investigation into ExxonMobil’s activities launched by 
several AGs in March 2016, after several AGs claimed the company engaged in actionable fraud 
by suppressing evidence of its contribution to climate change. This investigation, and the 
reaction to it from opposing AGs and their allies in Congress and the private sector, highlights 
the deepening relationships between AGs and those inside and outside of government. 
 
The Clean Power Plan and Subsequent AG Challenges 
Similar to immigration policy, much of the Obama-era federal action pertaining to 
climate change policy was spurred not by Congress but by executive action. Beginning with EPA 
 rulemaking establishing that greenhouse gases endangered human health or welfare, a key 
finding that set the stage for invoking many of the CAA’s provisions, the Obama 
Administration’s EPA subsequently issued regulations pertaining to greenhouse gas emissions 
from motor vehicles.13 The EPA also sought to expand regulation of power plants and other 
major greenhouse gas emitters, taking a series of aggressive regulatory steps in the absence of 
new congressional legislation on the subject. The centerpiece of these efforts was the Clean 
Power Plan (CPP) announced in June 2014, which consisted of a series of rules requiring 
existing electric generating utilities to reduce emissions levels to 32 percent below their 2005 
levels in the next fifteen years. President Obama suggested that the CPP was “the single most 
important step America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change” and a crucial 
part of the administration’s attempts to force power plants to shift from coal to wind and solar 
power (White House 2015). 
Just days after Obama’s announcement of the CPP, Ohio coal mining firm Murray 
Energy filed a petition in the D.C. Circuit calling for the court to declare the rules invalid.14 A 
week later, West Virginia AG Patrick Morrissey and eleven other AGs filed an amicus curiae 
brief supporting Murray Energy’s positon.15 What was particularly unusual about this challenge 
was that it was launched before the regulations were even finalized in the Federal Register, 
typically the stage at which legal challenges to new regulations begin. According to the AGs, this 
early challenge was justified because the CPP’s tight deadlines for state compliance with federal 
mandates meant that the states would have significant expenditures immediately. 
Shortly after this challenge, both the AGs and Murray Energy filed additional complaints 
in the D.C. Circuit challenging a 2010 settlement agreement signed by the EPA that had set the 
stage for EPA regulation of existing power plants.16 The settlement agreement had resolved a 
 lawsuit initiated in 2006 by a coalition of Democratic AGs and environmental groups seeking to 
force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases emitted from power plants. Under the terms of the 
settlement, the EPA agreed to issue new regulations under §111(d) of the CAA, which pertains 
the state-implemented pollution standards for existing power plants.17 The problem, according to 
the West Virginia-led AG coalition, was that the CAA did not allow regulation under this section 
if the same power plants were already regulated under §112 of the CAA, which governs 
hazardous air pollutants standards. They claimed the EPA was trying to circumvent this 
limitation by committing the agency to regulate under §111(d) through a binding legal agreement 
with collusive AGs and environmental groups. 
The D.C. Circuit eventually sided against the West Virginia coalition, ruling that it did 
not have the authority to review mere proposed rules and rejecting the challenge to the 2011 
settlement agreement on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge it (In re 
Murray Energy Corp., Nos. 14-1112 et al. [D.C. Cir. June 9, 2015]). However, this concluded 
only the first wave of litigation over the CPP. On the same day that the EPA finalized the CPP in 
October 2015, a coalition of twenty-four AGs and state agencies filed a motion to stay the rules 
(West Virginia, et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363 [D.C. Cir., filed October 23, 2015]).  Other AGs filed 
separate but closely linked challenges, as did a large number of business associations, labor 
groups, and utilities. The basic argument was that the states and other groups would suffer 
“immediate and irreparable harm” due to the tight timeline demanded by the EPA for states to 
implement the new rules. The plaintiffs argued that they were likely to prevail on the merits for 
the same statutory and constitutional reasons as the parties had raised in the earlier litigation 
prior to the EPA’s finalized rule. 
 The litigation generated numerous filings from states either challenging or supporting the 
EPA, as indicated in Table 3. A counter-coalition of nineteen Democratic AGs, led by New York 
AG Eric Schneiderman, intervened to support the EPA’s position. Several environmental and 
industry groups also joined the EPA’s position. Members of Congress became involved in the 
litigation as well, filing amicus briefs on highly polarized lines either supporting or opposing the 
challenge.18 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In a brief order in January 2016, the D.C. Circuit denied the request to stay the CPP. 
However, the AGs and allied groups took the unusual step of asking the Supreme Court for a 
stay, despite the fact that the lower court had not yet addressed the merits of the case. This 
unusual request paid off. By a five-four vote on February 9, 2016 – only four days before Justice 
Scalia died –  the Supreme Court issued a stay of the program until the lower court decided the 
merits. This marked the first time that the Court granted a request to halt a regulation before a 
lower court had even reviewed it (Liptak and Davenport 2016).  
The Supreme Court’s stay meant that the program could not be implemented until the 
D.C. Circuit, and eventually the Supreme Court, resolves the merits of the dispute. The D.C. 
Circuit held over seven hours of oral arguments in September 2016, and a decision on the merits 
is (as of April 2017) pending. Most importantly, however, the Republican sweep in the 2016 
elections offered the Trump Administration a chance to reverse the CPP through executive and 
legislative actions regardless of future judicial decisions. Indeed, in March 2017 President Trump 
issued an executive order directing the rollback of the CPP, and the Scott Pruitt-led EPA asked 
 the D.C. Circuit to delay a ruling in the case until the agency had an opportunity to respond to 
Trump’s executive order (Rodriguez 2017). Given that the CPP looks likely to be reversed 
during Trump’s presidency, the West Virginia-led AGs’ strategy of delaying the plan until the 
subsequent administration appears to have been successful. 
 
AGs United for Clean Power  
The West Virginia v. EPA litigation was probably the most important of the AG 
challenges to various EPA regulations during the Obama Administration. Yet it was not only AG 
opponents of expanded climate change regulation who have acted. AGs seeking greater 
regulatory steps to address climate change have employed new strategies to expand regulation by 
directly targeting the utilities the AGs allege have contributed climate change. 
The key effort began in March 2016 when a coalition of sixteen AGs, along with several 
local officials and former Vice President Al Gore, announced the formation of “AGs United for 
Clean Power.” The stated purpose of this group, which consisted mainly of the same Democratic 
members of the AG coalition that had intervened to support the EPA in West Virginia v. EPA, 
was to determine whether the company lied to investors and the public about the threat to climate 
change and the company’s contributions to it. Among other things, the group members sought to 
focus on Exxon Mobil’s funding of outside groups that challenged climate science and whether 
statements made to investors about climate risks conflicted with the company’s own internal 
studies (Schwartz 2016a). 
The new coalition was the culmination of a four-year coordinated strategy by 
environmental organizations to hold “Big Oil” legally accountable for climate change denial 
(McKenna 2016). Starting in 2012, leading members from these groups had strategized about 
 how to best fight the energy industry in the courts in order to procure internal documents and 
spur attention to the industry’s political strategies. These groups saw promise in teaming with 
AGs, especially given the wide range of investigatory powers AGs have under federal and state 
laws. The strategy began to come to fruition in November 2015, when New York AG Eric 
Schneiderman issued a subpoena to ExxonMobil demanding four decades of documents relating 
to internal company communications on climate change. Following this action, members of the 
environmental organizations met with AGs early in 2016 to discuss legal strategies going 
forward – a meeting that was followed shortly after by the announcement of the AGs United for 
Clean Power. 
This coalition’s legal strategy aimed to follow the pattern of the AGs’ tobacco litigation 
in the late 1990s, a point made explicitly by Gore during the press conference announcing the 
group. The tobacco litigation, which eventually involved all of the nation’s AGs, featured AGs 
using their significant investigative powers to force the industry to divulge information about 
what the company had known about the health risks of tobacco. Among the millions of 
documents obtained during the investigation were several that implied that the industry knew 
more about the dangers of smoking than the companies were admitting publically. These, in turn, 
provided leverage for the AGs to settle their claims with the largest tobacco manufacturers as 
part of a $206 billion global settlement in 1998 that remains the largest civil settlement in 
American history. In addition to the money, the settlement contained several regulatory 
provisions essentially restructuring the entire industry and limiting tobacco advertising and 
lobbying (Derthick 2012). 
Similarly, the AGs part of the group intended to uncover similar “smoking guns” that 
could be used to eventually force ExxonMobil and other energy companies to enter regulatory 
 settlements. “It’s too early to say what we’re going to find,” Schneiderman said during the 
announcement of the coalition, but “we intend to work as aggressively as possible” (Schwartz 
2016a). The effort would include bringing to bear several laws granting AGs wide investigatory 
powers, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and several 
state consumer protection and deceptive business and trade practices acts. These same statutes 
had played a major role in the tobacco litigation as well. The AGs argued that this effort was 
necessary in light of the federal government’s failure to do more to address climate change. As 
Rhode Island AG Peter Kilmartin put it, “if Washington is not going to step up and recognize the 
crisis and find meaningful solutions, then it will be up to the states to do so” (New York 
Attorney General 2016). 
While most of the AGs attending the meeting did not reveal whether they had started any 
investigations, three AGs did specify that they had opened their own investigations – California 
AG Kamala Harris, Massachusetts AG Maura Healey, and U.S. Virgin Islands AG Claude 
Walker. Walker’s investigation was particularly wide-ranging, as he issued subpoenas not only 
to ExxonMobil but also to conservative organizations looking for evidence that the company 
teamed up with ideological groups to oppose climate change (Schwartz 2016c).  
The announcement of the AGs United for Clean Power group and its intentions to 
conduct wider probes into the energy industry sparked a considerable backlash. ExxonMobil 
filed suit against Healey and Walker, arguing that the AGs’ subpoenas violated due process as 
well as the company’s free speech rights (Exxon Mobil v. Walker, No. 017-284890-16 [Dist. Ct. 
Tarrant County, Tex., April 13, 2016]; Exxon Mobil v. Healey, No. 4:16-cv-00469-A [N.D. Tex. 
June 15, 2016]). Soon after, eleven Republican AGs filed an amicus brief supporting 
ExxonMobil’s attempt to enjoin their fellow AG’s investigation into the company. The brief 
 accused their colleague of “using law enforcement authority to resolve a public policy debate” 
and argued that Massachusetts’ actions represented “an abuse of its subpoena powers.”19 
Members of Congress also pushed back on the states’ investigations. In May 2016, the 
Republican members of the U.S. House’s Committee on Science, Space, and Technology sent a 
letter to Schneiderman informing him of the committee’s intention to investigate the AGs’ 
“coordinated attempt to deprive companies, nonprofit organizations, and scientists of their First 
Amendment rights and ability to fund and conduct scientific research free from intimidation and 
threats of prosecution.” The committee subpoenaed numerous documents from the AGs and 
several environmental groups, including any communications the AG members had with the 
environmental advocacy groups, other AGs, and representatives of federal agencies.20 This 
marked the first time that a House committee had subpoenaed a state AG (Schwartz 2016d). 
The AGs refused to comply with the congressional subpoenas, calling the request “a 
dangerous overreach by the Committee and an affront to states' rights” (Hasemyer 2016). 
Nevertheless, the legal pushback from ExxonMobil and its AG amici led to both Walker and 
Healey withdrawing their subpoenas. As of this writing, the AGs’ investigations remain active, 
though it remains unclear to what extent courts will allow the investigations to proceed. 
 
Lessons of the Climate Change Battles 
Regardless of the ultimate result of the CPP challenges and the AG investigations of 
ExxonMobil, they both highlight several key aspects of AG activism during the latter years of 
the Obama Administration. For one, AGs remain as committed as ever to the creative use of their 
expansive powers – which operate largely independently from other state officials – to achieve 
national public policy goals. This now firmly entrenched nationalized activism has meant that 
 AG strategizing about potential legal challenges is ongoing and anticipatory, rather than ad hoc 
and reactive. Republican AGs were already in conversations about how to challenge the CPP 
before even the proposed rules were announced, allowing near-immediate challenges to 
administration policies. The plaintiff AG coalition employed something of a “kitchen sink” 
approach of using various substantive and procedural arguments to delay the rules, including 
taking the unusual step of challenging the EPA’s new rules at every stage before they even 
became final. Likewise, the AGs United for Clean Power initiative has relied upon new 
arguments based on expansive definitions of “fraud” in state investigations to advance broader 
nationally-focused goals on climate change.  
Unlike many previous federalism disputes in American history that have primarily 
involved regional divisions, it is partisan divisions that have been most prominent in these 
disputes. As with the West Virginia v. EPA litigation, Democratic and Republican AGs have 
taken opposing positions on climate change mirroring the broader partisan coalitions of which 
they are a part. In this way, the Obama-era legal battles over federal policies affecting federalism 
simply cannot be characterized as involving “the states versus the national government.” Instead, 
these battles involve sharp conflicts among the states themselves, with some challenging and 
others defending the exercise of federal power. This partisanship is also apparent in the 
remarkable conflict over the past year involving the investigations of ExxonMobil, in which AGs 
partnered with the target of the investigation to argue against their fellow AGs’ exercise of 
prosecutorial power. 
 The climate change battles also provide a good example of AG alliances with like-
minded outside groups. The idea of employing RICO and state consumer protection statutes 
against energy firms originated with environmental interest groups that later worked with the 
 Democratic AGs implementing the strategy in the ExxonMobil investigations. This builds upon 
relationships forged between AGs and environmental group allies during the Bush and Obama 
Administrations, which included Massachusetts v. EPA and various subsequent efforts to force 
the federal government to address climate change. Meanwhile, Republican AGs worked with 
industry groups to defend against stricter pollution regulations, joining with ExxonMobil against 
their fellow AGs’ investigations and coordinating legal strategies with Murray Energy in the 
parallel CPP challenges.  
Throughout these battles, both sides have used evidence of these AG-outside group 
collaborations as a basis to attack the opposing side. The collaborations between environmental 
groups and AGs sparked the congressional investigation into AGs United for Clean Power. 
Similarly, Republican AGs pointed to “collusive” settlements between liberal AGs, 
environmental groups, and the EPA as evidence of a “sue-and-settle” strategy meant to operate 
as an end-run around Congress and the regulatory process (Monies 2013). Democratic AGs 
demanded that Republican AGs reveal their connections with industry groups during the West 
Virginia v. EPA litigation, and pointed out that Murray Energy had donated $250,000 to the 
Republican Attorneys General Association shortly before the litigation began (Dlouhy 2016). 
The increasing partisanship among AGs has occurred amidst the broader polarization 
throughout the Obama years. AG challenges to Obama Administration policies represented an 
opportunity for a broader national Republican coalition to stop regulatory initiatives – something 
the Republican Congress could not accomplish legislatively because of President Obama’s veto 
power. In much the same way, Democratic AG-led initiatives such as the AGs United for Clean 
Power were attempts to advance the goals of a broader partisan coalition without the necessity of 
involving Congress. 
  
COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION IN AG ACTIVITY 
As important as these deepening partisan and ideological trends have been, AGs have 
continued to find common ground in much of their work. For one, Democratic and Republican 
AGs continue to work closely on criminal law issues, frequently appearing on bipartisan amicus 
briefs in federal court (Nolette 2014). Additionally, AGs have continued bipartisan enforcement 
efforts to fight alleged corporate fraud affecting multiple states – efforts frequently resulting in 
multistate settlements involving all or nearly all the nation’s AGs (Yelkin 2007). Particularly 
important have been a series of multistate settlements with pharmaceutical companies targeting 
alleged fraud that have served to reform the industry’s drug pricing and advertising nationwide 
(Nolette 2015b). Additionally, the federal government has sought more integrated federal-state 
enforcement efforts to achieve shared priorities, particularly concerning criminal law 
enforcement and anti-fraud initiatives. AGs have been the beneficiaries of increased enforcement 
capabilities and federal funding dating to the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and 
establishment of the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units in 1978. Information 
sharing between the Department of Justice, other federal enforcement agencies, and the AGs has 
been a feature of cooperative enforcement efforts for decades.  
Nevertheless, the AGs’ relationship with federal enforcement agencies was frequently 
rocky during the George W. Bush years. Agencies such as the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency sought to preempt AGs’ role in corporate investigations, federal funding for state 
enforcement efforts faced cuts, and previously active federal-state working groups received 
lessened priority (National Association of Attorneys General 2009). As soon as Obama entered 
office, the National Association of Attorneys General urged the administration to establish a 
 stronger relationship between the federal DOJ and state AGs (National Association of Attorneys 
General 2009). 
 
Recent Trends Towards Greater Cooperation in AG Activities 
The Obama Administration responded by expanding cooperative state-federal 
enforcement efforts in several ways. Several of the earliest major Obama legislative initiatives, 
including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as well as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, deputized AGs to enforce new federal laws. Federal 
funding for AG enforcement efforts, such as through Byrne Justice Assistance Grants, expanded 
dramatically in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (McKay 2009). The 
Department of Justice and other key federal enforcement agencies drew heavily from the ranks 
of state-level enforcement personnel, likely contributing to the state-friendly attitude within these 
federal agencies.  
The improved federal-state relationships were perhaps most apparent with the 
proliferation of multiagency task forces and working groups involving federal and state law 
enforcement personnel working together to address similar problems. Across a range of 
enforcement issues – from payday lending, to antitrust enforcement, to mortgage fraud – these 
initiatives have made AGs crucial partners in advancing national enforcement priorities.  
The central effort was the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force established by 
President Obama’s executive order in November 2009. The Task Force aimed “to wage 
aggressive and coordinated investigations and prosecutions of financial frauds and maximize the 
ability both to recover the proceeds of these frauds and obtain just and effective punishment of 
those who commit them” (Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force n.d.). Since its creation, 
 several interagency working groups have been housed under the broader Task Force, including 
groups pertaining to loan fraud, securities and commodity fraud, and financial institution fraud. 
In addition to the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, the Department of Justice worked 
closely with AGs on various additional task forces ranging from intellectual property issues to 
antitrust enforcement. Throughout the past several years, the AGs’ involvement in these 
collaborative efforts has been largely bipartisan.   
The multiagency taskforce activity has resulted in considerable enforcement activity. In 
some cases, the close cooperation and information-sharing among federal-state enforcers has 
resulted in several separate but closely related settlements with individual targeted firms. For 
example, the DOJ and AGs worked together to investigate government claims that Volkswagen 
cheated emissions tests and deceived consumers, which ultimately resulted in closely linked 
federal and state settlements with the company in June 2016 (U.S. Department of Justice 2016). 
In others, these efforts have resulted in a single federal-state settlement with the corporate targets 
of the investigations. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, for example, concluded a 
$26 billion joint federal-state settlement in 2012 between several federal agencies, forty-nine 
AGs, and the five largest mortgage servicers in the country. In addition to the monetary 
provisions, the settlement contained several new regulatory code-of-conduct provisions requiring 
substantial changes to how the servicers do business. These provisions achieved regulatory goals 
without congressional action or proceeding through the typical regulatory process (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2012). 
The AGs’ close and largely bipartisan cooperation with the Obama Administration’s 
enforcement efforts contrasts with the simultaneous and contentious AG pushback on numerous 
Obama Administration initiatives. I now turn to a case study that helps illustrate the cooperative 
 side of the relationship: coordinated efforts to investigate the for-profit higher education 
industry. While just one of many similarly collaborative federal-state efforts, I focus on the for-
profit education sector in part because these efforts have received less attention than the more 
high-profile efforts involving the financial sector after the Great Recession and because of the 
sheer effect that this litigation had on a major national industry. What had been a rapidly 
growing sector was, after AG investigations and Obama Administration actions, a much 
diminished and besieged one. Additionally, like the tobacco litigation and mortgage litigation 
mentioned earlier, this litigation illustrates that AGs have increasingly taken advantage of not 
only federalism as a veto point to block policy, but as an opportunity point advancing policy 
goals in the absence of new congressional legislation. In this case, AGs partnered with 
likeminded members of the federal executive branch to build on each other’s efforts and place 
additional regulatory pressure on the industry. 
  
Cooperative Federalism in Action: Oversight of the For-Profit Higher Education Industry 
Most colleges and universities in the United States have historically been non-profit 
institutions. The for-profit model grew rapidly beginning in the 1970s, however, following an 
amendment to the Higher Education Act allowing for-profit institutions access to federal funds 
(including grants and student loans). Institutions such as the University of Phoenix, DeVry 
University, ITT Tech, and several others gained thousands of students during the rapid growth of 
the industry in the decades since. By 2007, the Department of Education stated that the number 
of for-profit colleges and universities has grown to over 1,000 institutions, and in 2009 
enrollment in these institutions reached its peak (Lederman 2010). The University of Phoenix, 
claiming some 300,000 students nationwide, became the largest private university in America.  
 Despite this rapid growth, however, the high percentage of student defaults and low 
graduation rates led to increased federal scrutiny of the industry as early as the 1980s. But it was 
a pair of key federal government reports that provided additional attention to the industry and 
escalated the industry’s legal problems. A 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) suggested that students at for-profit schools had particularly low graduation rates yet 
were left with very high debt levels (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009). Another 
GAO report the following year found evidence of deceptive tactics and fraud at several for-profit 
colleges. The report, which followed an undercover sting involving investigators posing as 
students interested in enrolling in for-profit colleges, detailed how several colleges encouraged 
students to provide false information on student loan applications. The report also found that 
school officials at fifteen for-profit institutions had also provided misleading information about 
the programs’ costs and the employment prospects for students graduating from the programs 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010). 
Significant subsequent revisions to the GAO report softened several of its harshest 
evaluations of the industry, leading to criticism of the GAO by Republican members of Congress 
and to a lawsuit by a for-profit education industry group (Weinberger 2011). Nevertheless, the 
report sparked additional oversight of the industry from several quarters. The GAO’s report was 
followed up by a two-year investigation led by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) that highlighted 
various problems in the industry (U.S. Senate HELP Committee 2012). Meanwhile, the 
Department of Education proposed new regulations, referred to as “gainful employment” rules, 
which would cut off federal funding to for-profit colleges whose graduates did not earn enough 
to repay their loans (Epstein 2010). 
 
 AGs’ Involvement and the Taskforce on For-Profit Education 
In addition to sparking additional activity from congressional committees and federal 
agencies, the GAO’s findings sparked a series of new investigations, including several led by 
AGs. Several individual AGs had been involved in investigations of for-profit colleges as early 
as the mid-2000s, spurred in part by the AGs’ concerns that federal agencies were not making 
progress in developing stronger oversight of the industry (Dillon 2007). With the GAO report 
and increasing federal activity in this area, the AGs’ investigations quickly expanded. The 
Florida AG’s office opened up a major investigation of eight for-profit colleges shortly after the 
release of the GAO report, and the New York Attorney General started investigating institutions 
that had been found by GAO to have deceptive recruiting tactics. Other AGs soon followed with 
their own independent investigations, several of which led to multi-million dollar settlements 
from 2011 to 2013. 
The major AG probe of the industry began in January 2014, when a dozen AGs 
collectively served a series of subpoenas and civil investigative demands on four major for-profit 
schools. These actions were part of a larger bipartisan coalition of thirty-two AGs investigating 
the industry, led by Kentucky AG Jack Conway. The investigation was predicated on the theory 
that the for-profit schools had violated several state consumer protection statutes through the 
types of behavior uncovered by the GAO and the Harkin probe. These investigations occurred 
alongside enforcement actions by the newly-created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission against the same schools in the AG 
investigations. At the time, Conway suggested that he expected AG collaboration with federal 
agencies to increase in the coming months (Armor and Zibel 2014).  
 This collaboration came to fruition in October of 2014, when the Department of 
Education announced the creation of a new interagency taskforce on for-profit education. The 
taskforce, which included as members several federal agencies as well as AGs, sought to 
formalize a working group that had (among other things) launched the investigations earlier in 
the year. According to the DOE, the task force’s purpose would allow members to “leverage 
their resources and expertise to assist one another, thereby making the best use of scarce 
resources and better protecting the interests of students and taxpayers” (U.S. Department of 
Education 2014). This collaboration strengthened further in 2016 when the Federal Trade 
Commission stated that it would take additional consumer protection enforcement measures 
alongside AGs. 
Since its creation, the interagency taskforce has taken various actions against several for-
profit schools and in a relatively short time placed the entire industry on life support. Some of the 
actions occurred independently but parallel to one another, with federal agencies and AGs 
sharing information leading to subpoenas and subsequent lawsuits against the same institutions. 
Other actions have resulted in single, coordinated federal-state settlements conducted in a similar 
fashion to the settlements achieved by the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.  
For example, a November 2015 settlement with Education Management Corporation 
(EDMC) involving the federal government and thirty-nine AGs resolved a variety of claims 
against the company. These claims included state consumer protection claims as well as under 
the federal False Claims Act, which allows the government to recover funds from private entities 
who used fraud to obtain public money. The settlement included a $95 million fine paid to the 
government and $102 million worth of debt relief to affected students, but the settlement’s most 
important contributions were in its conduct terms. The terms, which read like agency regulations, 
 required the company to provide students additional disclosures, orientation programs, and 
opportunities to withdraw from programs free of charge. It also created a new industry monitor 
that would oversee the company’s compliance with the settlement terms (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2015). While only applicable to EDMC, the taskforce members stated that they hoped 
these terms would serve as a code of conduct for other members of the industry – including the 
many that remained potential targets of the AGs and the broader taskforce. 
 
Interagency Enforcement and the Cooperative Extension of the Regulatory State 
The progression of coordinated legal attacks on the for-profit higher education industry 
illustrates a different and more cooperative version of AG activism during the Obama 
Administration. In this case, investigations by the federal GAO and Congress provided 
momentum for AGs to pursue state-level probes themselves, which in turn helped feed further 
investigations by federal enforcement agencies. Eventually, the relationships between the federal 
government (the DOJ, CFPB, and other agencies) and the AGs strengthened as their 
investigations and settlements became explicitly cooperative.  
 As with other interagency task forces, particularly the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
Force, the resolution of investigations sought to achieve policy and regulatory changes in an 
industry in the face of perceived congressional inaction. Advocates for industry reform pressed 
Congress to curb alleged abuses, particularly after the initial GAO report, but little legislative 
action was forthcoming. The response was to employ enforcement actions to achieve quasi-
regulatory settlements that sought to establish the new codes of conduct Congress would not.  
This cooperative activity has tended to attract more bipartisan support. Most of the 
nation’s AGs, both Democrats and Republicans, were involved in the federal/state investigations 
 into the for-profit education sector. That said, these efforts have received some criticism for 
potentially exceeding executive power at the expense of Congress. As the interagency taskforce 
on for-profit education became more active, for example, several Republican U.S. Senators sent 
a letter to the DOE Secretary skeptically probing the purposes of and statutory authority for the 
task force.21 The taskforce’s formation, after all, occurred amidst failures to enact the Proprietary 
Education Oversight Coordination Improvement Act (also supported by many AGs), which 
would have explicitly allowed interagency oversight of the for-profit education industry. As 
“informal” coordination, by contrast, the taskforce did not have similar legislative authority. 
Nevertheless, the initiative continued to generate bipartisan enforcement actions throughout the 
remainder of the Obama presidency. 
As with many other policy areas, it remains to be seen how the Trump Administration 
will handle allegations of fraud by for-profit educational institutions. Many observers believed a 
significant policy shift would occur, particularly given that Trump’s own for-profit university 
was the target of an AG investigation that settled for $25 million shortly after the 2016 election, 
and his Education Secretary, Betsy DeVos, has been an advocate for private educational 
institutions. Yet the Trump Administration also defended stricter Obama-era regulations in court 
against an industry challenge, suggesting that the administration will abide by at least some of 
the new regulatory accomplishments during the previous administration (Bloomberg News 
2017). 
Regardless of what the federal government does, the cooperation among AGs on this 
issue continues as well. Several of the AGs involved in the Obama-era for-profit education 
probes vowed to continue their investigations with or without the federal government. Just days 
after President Trump entered office, for example, AGs sought to intervene in a federal case 
 against a major for-profit college accreditor. The timing was not coincidental; in the words of 
one education policy observer, “the intervention serves as a form of insurance” in case the 
Trump Administration attempted to drop the lawsuit (Waldman 2017). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Both the conflictual and cooperative elements of AG activity during Obama’s presidency 
contributed to the entrenchment of AGs’ roles in national policy. Republican AGs established 
mechanisms of coordination amongst themselves to find new ways of challenging Obama’s 
policies. This in turn spurred the creation of Democratic AG coalitions that supported the 
administration and sought innovative ways to use their powers of investigation to achieve liberal 
policy goals. The AGs’ more cooperative relationships with the federal government also served 
to bolster AG power. The Obama Administration invited AGs to work with executive officials as 
part of several interagency taskforces, in the process forging strong and continuous relationships 
between federal and state law enforcement. In addition to both sides generating and sharing 
information about potential enforcement actions, AGs and federal agencies built on the each 
other’s efforts to place additional pressure on national industries to change their practices. 
Negotiated settlements between federal agencies, AGs, and leading members of industry 
established new regulatory baselines and codes of conduct across national industries – even as 
congressional efforts to address alleged abuses in economic sectors such as mortgage lending 
and for-profit higher education stalled. 
With a Trump Administration pursuing very different goals alongside unified Republican 
governance on the federal level, it remains to be seen how the relationships between AGs and the 
federal government will evolve. However, several of the trends emerging during the Obama 
 years appear likely to continue. Indeed, the AGs’ entrenched role as a veto point frustrating 
administration policies paid dividends for Democratic AGs even in the early weeks of Trump’s 
presidency. Very shortly after Trump announced new immigration limits via executive order, 
several AGs successfully enjoined the actions in court (Associated Press 2017). Furthermore, 
much like their Republican counterparts during the Obama years, Democratic AGs are preparing 
to battle the Trump Administration on a variety of anticipated policy changes (Burns 2017). As 
Xavier Becerra, who relinquished a top leadership position in Congress for the chance to become 
California’s AG, remarked in reference to challenging President Trump in court: “I see it as a 
team sport” (Hart 2017).   
AGs are likely to continue seeking additional ways of expanding their authority to 
achieve their policy goals. Democratic AGs partnered with legal actors in increasingly 
Democratic cities to challenge Trump’s immigration orders, and have vowed to partner with 
them again if the president acts to cut federal funding as retaliation for localities refusing to 
enforce federal immigration laws (The Economist 2017). AGs have also used the expansive 
interpretations of state standing developed in Republican challenges to Obama’s policies to 
challenge Trump’s executive orders.22 Meanwhile, one Democratic state legislature (Maryland) 
enacted legislation providing its Democratic AG expanded powers to circumvent the Republican 
governor in order to sue Trump – the first time Maryland had expanded its AG’s power since 
1864 (Cox 2017). 
This sort of ideological conflict among the AGs and other institutions is likely to continue 
and perhaps strengthen further, reflecting both the trends among AGs and the broader American 
political system. The last year of the Obama presidency, for example, witnessed an 
unprecedented effort by Republican AGs – along with fellow Republicans in Congress – to 
 challenge Democratic AGs’ authority to conduct their own in-state (but coordinated) 
investigations of ExxonMobil. While individual AGs have occasionally criticized allegedly 
overzealous investigations by AGs of the other party, AGs’ active intervention in litigation 
opposing their fellow AGs’ state-level investigations is a new development. 
The sharpening polarization of AG activism has also been reflected in partisan conflicts 
between AGs and other state-level officials. During the Obama Administration, governors and 
AGs of the opposite party clashed frequently. Republican governors claimed the authority to 
represent the state in litigation challenging federal law when Democratic AGs refused to do so, 
over objections that the AG has the sole authority to represent the state in court (Baltz 2015). 
Several Democratic AGs took the unusual position of refusing to defend challenges to their own 
state’s laws in the context of same-sex marriage and controversial transgender bathroom bills, 
spurring in-state Republicans to seek their own legal counsel to take up the defense (e.g., Blythe 
2016). Even more recently, Republican Texas AG provided another example of intra-state 
conflict by joining lawsuits challenging policies adopted by Texas cities under Democratic 
control, and Maine’s Democratic AG sued the Republican governor for violating the state’s open 
meetings law (Formby 2016; Thistle 2016). 
The emergence of new avenues of partisan conflict is due not only to the continuing 
polarization in American society generally, but is also a consequence of the strengthening 
collaborations between AGs and like-minded ideological allies outside of government. Several of 
the Republican-led challenges to Obama Administration policies received strategic and financial 
support from conservative and industry groups, and Democratic AGs have continued to 
coordinate with liberal groups on litigation strategies. Meanwhile, the respective Republican and 
Democratic AG Associations have become major lobbying targets, including by business entities 
 subject to possible investigations and private class-action attorneys looking to partner with AGs 
on lawsuits (Lipton 2014).  
While there are few signs that the polarized AG activism of the Obama years will 
disappear during the Trump presidency, it is unclear whether and how federal executives in the 
next administration will work cooperatively with AGs to address common concerns. The Obama 
Administration took particular care to include AGs in interagency enforcement taskforces, in part 
to strengthen the prospects that the regulatory provisions of global federal-state settlements 
would stick. However, the combination of unified Republican government and a more 
deregulatory outlook on the part of federal agencies during the Trump Administration may lessen 
the commitment to this form of cooperation as a method of industry oversight. Even so, AGs and 
the federal DOJ may find areas to work collaboratively on some enforcement issues, much as 
they did despite often testy relationships during the conservative George W. Bush 
Administration – including, importantly, on joint federal-state efforts to tackle issues of crime, 
drugs, and Medicaid fraud. During his first address to the National Association of Attorneys 
General, for example, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a new Task Force on Crime 
Reduction and Public Safety that would work collaboratively with AGs (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2017). 
Regardless of how the balance of contention and cooperation among AGs and the federal 
government shapes up in the coming years, it is safe to say that AGs will not easily concede the 
considerable influence on the national stage that they have built up over the past two presidential 
administrations. President Trump, like Obama and Bush before him, will need to contend with 
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